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Massachusetts is a national leader in the advancement of offshore wind.  The Energy Diversity Act, 
Chapter 188 of the Acts of 2016 (“Energy Diversity Act”), signed by Governor Baker in August 2016, 
directed the Massachusetts Electric Distribution Companies (EDCs) to jointly and competitively solicit 
proposals for 1,600 megawatts (MW) of offshore wind energy generation through multiple solicitations 
conducted with the Department of Energy Resources (DOER) and to subsequently enter into cost-
effective long-term contracts for such.  This led the EDCs and DOER to solicit for and ultimately select 
800 megawatts (MW) of offshore wind from Vineyard Wind at $65/megawatt-hour (MWh) (2017$) in 
May 2018, kickstarting major development of the industry in New England. The EDCs and DOER are 
currently in the process of soliciting and procuring the remaining 800 MW of offshore wind authorized 
by the Energy Diversity Act.  
In 2018, Massachusetts passed An Act to Advance Clean Energy, Chapter 227 of the Acts of 2018, which 
required DOER, by July 31, 2019, to 1) investigate the necessity, benefits and costs of requiring the EDCs 
to conduct solicitations and procurements for up to 1,600 MW of additional offshore wind and 2) 
evaluate the previous solicitation and procurement process and make recommendations for any 
improvements.1  This additional offshore wind, subject of the study, is beyond the initial 1,600 MW 
authorized by the Energy Diversity Act.  
Offshore wind is a renewable resource that offers numerous benefits.  An additional 1,600 MW 
procurement of offshore wind energy will result in over 6,000,000 MWh of annual clean energy when 
fully online. Offshore wind energy generation has a greater capacity factor, approaching 50 percent on 
an annual basis, than many other renewable energy generators such as solar, especially during winter 
months. This is due to the high-quality wind resources off New England’s coast and advancements in 
turbine technology.  As seen in Figure 1, the first solicitation of offshore wind was cost competitive with 
other clean energy policies. 
                                                          
1 As part of this Study, DOER reviewed the process of the first 83C solicitation but did not complete a review of 
second 83C solicitation for the remaining 800 MW as the solicitation is currently ongoing and will not be complete 




Figure 1: Cost Comparison of Clean Energy Policies2 
Overview 
Over the last decade, state and federal governments have worked extensively to identify wind energy 
lease areas for offshore wind development that minimize environmental impacts. To date, the Bureau of 
Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) has delineated 15 lease areas from Massachusetts to North 
Carolina.  Many developers have secured development rights to the lease areas through an auction 
process undertaken by BOEM.  The first leases were auctioned in 2013 off the coast of Massachusetts 
and went for $3.8 million. In the second auction for the lease areas off Massachusetts held in 2015, the 
price for leases went for less than $300,000.  Since then, the offshore wind energy industry in the US has 
developed rapidly and competition for the lease areas has exceeded anticipations.  In comparison, at the 
most recent auction held in 2018 for leases off the coast of Massachusetts, the cost to secure a lease 
culminated at $135 million. In addition to the 15 lease areas already identified by BOEM, the federal 
government has identified additional call areas off the coasts of New York and South Carolina for 
potential future offshore wind development.  Figure 2 depicts the current holders. 
                                                          




Figure 2: Location of Offshore Wind Lease Areas 
Following the Commonwealth’s lead, several other states along the Atlantic Seaboard have been 
aggressively pursuing long-term contracts for offshore wind in order to advance their clean energy goals 
and to secure investment in local economic development. In 2017, Maryland Public Service Commission 
announced in an Order that it had selected two projects, the 248 MW US Wind project and 120 MW 
Skipjack project, for awarding Offshore Wind Renewable Energy Certificates (ORECs) to support the 
development of offshore wind.  In 2018 in collaboration with Massachusetts, Rhode Island procured 400 
MW from the Revolution Wind project.  Connecticut followed soon thereafter with an additional 
procurement of 200 MW from the Revolution Wind project in its “Best in Class Request for Proposal 
(RFP)”, and a subsequent 104 MW also from the Revolution Wind project through its Zero Carbon 
Resources RFP.  Both New York and New Jersey have followed with separate procurements for 
approximately 800 MW or more, and 1,100 MW, respectively.  As states are successfully completing 
offshore wind procurements, additional policies to expand their offshore wind goals are being 
considered in Maryland, Connecticut, and Virginia.  In New Hampshire, steps have been taken to 
establish an intergovernmental offshore renewable energy task force to deliberate on the identification 




DOER utilized a combination of both extensive stakeholder outreach and quantitative energy sector 
modeling, to analyze the cost-effectiveness of an additional 1,600 MW of offshore wind, the optimal 
timing of any future procurements, and other impacts on the environment and economy from the 
growth of offshore wind in Massachusetts. DOER solicited input from the public and key stakeholders, 
including environmental groups, developers, industry groups, EDCs, fisheries, and academia, through the 
issuance of written stakeholder questions and meetings with DOER staff.  
For the quantitative analysis, three project scenarios were modeled as representative examples of 
future offshore wind development, incorporating different nameplate capacity of additional offshore 
wind beyond the 83C target and different in-service dates to investigate the impact on the energy 
system and the Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) and Clean Energy Standard (CES) markets. These 
results were used to determine the cost and benefits of an additional 1,600 MW of offshore wind, 
optimal timing of any future procurements, and the impact on emissions and compliance with 
Massachusetts’s Global Warming Solutions Act (GWSA). 
Scenario Additional Offshore Wind In-Service Dates 
Reference Case 
 1,600 MW from First 83C, 
0 MW of Additional 
N/A 
Scenario 1 800 MW 2025 
Scenario 2 1,600 MW 800 MW in 2025 and 800 MW in 2027 
Scenario 3 1,600 MW 800 MW in 2028 and 800 MW in 2030 
Table 1: Modeling Scenarios 
This analysis assumes that cost-effective procurements occur when the projected benefits of buying 
clean energy through the contract are greater than the projected benefits of buying the same amount of 
clean energy in the wholesale energy markets and the renewable energy certificate (RECs) and clean 
energy certificate (CEC) markets. Any contracts executed through 83C may include two products from 
the offshore wind project: 1) wholesale energy and 2) RECs that can be used for compliance with the 
RPS and CES.3  The EDCs will use the contracted products either for their own customers or sell the 
products into the market, receiving payment that offsets ratepayer costs. These are the direct benefits 
of the contract (see Table 2).  The contracts also provide indirect benefits from reductions in wholesale 
energy and RPS and CES market costs as well as the avoided cost of complying with the GWSA emissions 
targets.  These indirect benefits occur when ratepayers pay less for energy if the new offshore wind 
                                                          
3 Section 83C allows for contracts that are either for energy and RECs or RECs alone. This analysis assumed offshore 




development reduces the market cost of all energy, also called market suppression, or when ratepayers 
avoid having to pay even more in the future to secure emission reductions in the electric sector.4  
Cost of Offshore Wind Contracts 
(What the EDCs are Buying through the 
Contract) 
Benefits from Offshore Wind Contracts 
(Savings Impacting Ratepayers) 
• Contract price for Energy 
• Sale of Energy into Wholesale Market (Direct Benefit) 
• Reduction in Wholesale Market Costs 
• Contract price for Renewable Energy 
Certificates (RECs) 
• Use of RECs for RPS and CES Compliance (Direct Benefit) 
• Reduction in Cost in the REC and CEC Markets 
• Avoided Cost of GWSA Compliance 
Table 2: Summary of Costs and Benefits for Future Clean Energy Procurements 
Findings - Necessity, Benefits and Costs 
1. Based on current market projections an additional procurement for 1,600 MW of offshore 
wind has a likelihood of cost-effectiveness that justifies additional solicitations.   
Using market projections for both the cost and the benefits of the contracts, all three scenarios were 
cost-effective showing a net benefit to ratepayers (see Table 3). An additional procurement for 1,600 
MW of offshore wind is projected to save ratepayers $670 million to $1.27 billion over the 20-year life of 
the contract versus purchasing the same amount of clean energy in the markets (energy plus 
RECs/CESs).  
The first 83C solicitation resulted in cost-effective clean energy at $65/MWh (2017$).  If future benefits 
are as projected in this study, the levelized cost would need to be less than approximately $71-75/MWh, 
or within about 10%, for a future 1,600 MW contract for the contracts to be quantifiably cost-effective.  
                                                          
4 This analysis utilized a value of $16.51 as the avoiding cost of Global Warming Solutions Act compliance, 
consistent with the first 83C solicitation. This value represents an avoiding cost of future emission reductions that 














1,600 MW of First 
83C, 0 MW of 
Additional 
N/A -- -- 
Scenario 1 800 MW 2025 $1.10 billion $16 
Scenario 2 1,600 MW 
800 MW in 2025 and 
800 MW in 2027 
$670 million $2 
Scenario 3 1,600 MW 
800 MW in 2028 and 
800 MW in 2030 
$1.27 billion $13 
Table 3: Quantitative Net Benefit Analysis 
Benefits are described above as “net” meaning inclusive of the costs (benefits minus costs equals net 
benefit), and as both total benefits, the amount of benefit anticipated from the project, and as levelized, 
the total benefits divided by the number of MWh of generation. The results are presented as the value 
today, in 2019 dollars.5 Scenario 3 shows the highest total projected benefits, providing an anticipated 
$1.27 billion of net benefit while Scenario 1 shows the highest levelized projected benefit at $16 of 
benefit per MWh purchased. Projected levelized benefits begin to decrease as the larger offshore wind 
procurements are modeled but Scenarios 2 and 3 with 1,600 MW of offshore wind are still cost-
effective, providing greater benefit than their anticipated costs. The impact of project size and timing on 
the levelized benefits is described in more detail in the findings below  
2. Offshore wind can provide significant contributions towards achieving GWSA targets and is 
particularly valuable in winter months. 
As seen in Figure 3, each scenario results in reductions to carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions across New 
England relative to the reference case through an increase of clean energy generation. Scenarios 2 and 3 
with 1,600 MW of offshore result in approximately double the amount of CO2 emissions reductions 
compared to procuring only an additional 800 MW.  The power system modeling showed that natural 
gas was the predominant fuel being displaced and other less clean fuels, such as oil, were also being 
displaced at times.  During severe winter storm events, offshore wind energy has particular benefit of 
lowering energy prices and reducing greenhouse gas emissions by minimizing reliance on oil and coal 
fired generation units because of its higher winter capacity factor than other renewable resources.6 
                                                          
5 The included analysis utilized an inflation rate of 2 percent and a discount rate (the electric distribution 
companies’ weighted cost of capital) at 6.99 percent, consistent with the first 83C solicitation.  
6 ISO-NE, High-Level Assessment of Potential Impacts of Offshore Wind Additions to the New England Power 






Figure 3: New England Emission Reductions 
3. However, the benefits of procuring an additional 1,600 MW of offshore wind is highly 
dependent on regional REC market projections, which have significant market uncertainty. 
The cost-effectiveness of any future contract is highly dependent on future changes to the regional REC 
market.  The value or benefit of RECs varies based on market supply and demand principles. The 
demand for RECs depends on both Massachusetts’ and other New England states’ RPS and CES 
obligations. These obligations are set as a percentage of total electric load, meaning as load increases so 
does the need and market demand for RECs.  Absent a flood of new RPS eligible resources, an increase 
in demand increases the market price and therefore value of any REC. The market value will continue to 
increase with demand until it is capped by the states’ alternative compliance payment (ACP) value 
where the RPS obligations can be met with a cash payment in lieu of a certificate.   
Using the forecasts for this study, the REC benefits for Scenario 2 are projected to be approximately 
$34/MWh. Figure 4 shows how various changes in the projections of the REC market can impact REC 
benefits of the additional offshore wind contracts. If electric load is higher than forecasted in this study 
because of greater electrification of transportation and heating increasing the RPS and CES compliance 
obligations, the benefits of procuring offshore wind increase, as seen in Figure 4 in purple. If there are 
more RECs in the regional market than forecasted in this study due to other states adding more clean 
energy, then the benefits of procuring offshore wind decreases, as seen in Figure 4 in green. Therefore, 
given the high amount of uncertainty with RPS market projections, any additional solicitations for 
offshore wind will need to be evaluated at the time of procurement to determine whether they are cost-





Figure 4: Total and Levelized REC Benefits - Scenario 3 
In recent years, the market value of RECs has declined because load has been decreasing from 
Massachusetts’ highly successful energy efficiency programs. There has also been a dramatic growth in 
the supply of RECs from renewable clean energy resources being built and developed throughout 
Massachusetts and from other states’ clean energy policies.  However, future policies to electrify the 
heating and transportation sectors would increase load and therefore increase the regional demand for 
RECs. 
4. There are greater benefits to offshore wind contracts in later years as RPS and CES obligations 
continue to increase. 
Because the RPS and CES obligations are designed to increase each year, projections indicate that there 
is more value to the REC supply produced from the additional offshore wind contracts in the later years, 
as seen in Figure 4.  In later years, the additional offshore wind is projected to be needed for the larger 
RPS and CES compliance obligation, offsetting higher market costs when supply is less than demand. In 
contrast, in early years, the number of RECs from offshore wind is projected to exceed the market 
demand. As a result, excess RECs would be sold at a low price into an oversupplied REC market, which 
would reduce the direct market benefit of the RECs. Further, if the RECs are sold and not retained for 
Massachusetts, the emissions reductions associated with the excess contracted offshore wind would not 
count towards GWSA compliance. 
Scenario 3 where the offshore wind comes online in 2028 and 2030 is more cost-effective than Scenario 
2 where offshore wind comes online in 2025 and 2028 because more of the additional offshore wind 
RECs are projected to be used to offset higher RPS and CES compliance costs as described above. 
Additionally, Scenario 1 with only 800 MW has lower total benefits due to its smaller size but higher 
levelized benefits because the project more closely aligns with the size of the RPS and CES obligations, 
thereby reducing the amount of “surplus” RECs that must be sold into the market at a depressed price. 
This analysis shows that the size and timing of any future offshore wind projects will impact the benefits 
to Massachusetts ratepayers.  
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5. Benefits for ratepayers are greatest if EDCs retain any excess additional offshore wind RECs 
that would otherwise be sold at a loss in the regional RPS market. 
If there are more RECs than needed for Massachusetts compliance, any RECs in excess of Massachusetts 
suppliers’ need are sold into a regional oversupply.  If the RECs are not retained, Massachusetts loses 
the emissions reductions associated with that energy and the contracted offshore wind does not count 
towards GWSA compliance. In order to counter this effect, Section 83C allows for DOER to notify the 
EDCs to retain purchased RECs to facilitate reaching GWSA targets.7 Figure 5 below shows the 
anticipated retention of RECs in the Base Case for Scenario 2. First, the EDCs would use the clean energy 
attributes they have on existing contracts, including the offshore wind projects procured through the 
first 83C solicitations, to meet their RPS and CES compliance obligations (Existing Contracted Clean 
Energy in grey). If there is still demand in the Massachusetts RPS, suppliers would then utilize any of the 
additional offshore wind attributes from Scenario 2 (Additional OSW in green).  If there is still demand 
after all the contracted clean energy was utilized, suppliers would utilize the regional market RECs that 
are not on contract (Regional Market RECs in yellow). Excess RECs must be sold unless DOER notifies the 
EDCs to return the RECs (Excess Additional OSW in light green).  It is projected that in early years (as 
shown in Figure 5 for years 2025-2031) with the additional 1,600 MW of offshore wind, the EDCs will 
contract for more RECs than needed for Massachusetts RPS and CES obligations. Instead of selling these 
excess RECs above the Massachusetts RPS obligation, DOER’s analysis shows that there are more 
benefits for ratepayers if the EDCs retain these RECs when market prices are very low and use the RECs 
toward GWSA emissions reduction targets (see Table 4). Although there would still be a small direct 
benefit from selling the REC into the oversupplied market, assumed to be $2 in this analysis, there would 
be a greater indirect benefit of retaining the REC for GWSA compliance and avoiding a future ratepayer 
cost to obtain additional clean energy to meet emission reduction targets.  
                                                          
7 “[P]rovided that the department of energy resources has not notified the distribution company that the 
renewable energy certificates should be retained to facilitate reaching emission reduction targets pursuant to 
chapter 298 of the acts of 2008 or chapter 21N of the General Laws, [the EDCs] shall sell the purchased renewable 




Figure 5: REC Retirement Relative to RPS and CES 
Quantitative Net Benefits 
Analysis 
Levelized Net Benefit or (Cost) ($/MWh) 
Sell Excess RECs Retire Excess RECs for GWSA 
Scenario 1 $16 $18 
Scenario 2 $2 $4 
Scenario 3 $13 $14 
Table 4: Benefit of Retiring Excess RECs  
6. There are benefits to continuing to enable the pairing of energy storage with offshore wind 
although analysis also shows the benefit of standalone storage on the grid that could enable 
grid flexibility for a number of resources including multiple offshore wind facilities. 
Offshore wind is an intermittent resource, generating electricity when the wind blows and not in 
response to electric demand. To support a growing amount of intermittent renewable energy 
generation, energy storage will need to be developed to charge during low cost periods when there is 
excess offshore wind and discharge during high cost peak times. Pairing energy storage with offshore 
wind will allow the Commonwealth to meet peak demand times with clean energy instead of high cost 
and high emissions fuel oil. These benefits will also be incentivized as part of the Clean Peak Standard 
(CPS) regulations that are currently under development by DOER.  
Energy storage can currently be procured through 83C as an allowable paired resource. Although 
proposals with energy storage were submitted in the first 83C solicitation, the selected project did not 
include paired storage. Because the contracted price from the selected project is now the price cap for 
future solicitations, it may be difficult to select energy storage in future solicitations. Although energy 
storage may provide greater benefits such as reducing costs and emissions during peak times and 
increasing grid flexibility, the additional cost of a paired energy storage project may be challenging 
under the current price cap.  
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Analysis showed that the greatest benefits came from energy storage systems that were connected 
directly to the grid instead of behind the meter of the additional offshore wind. Behind the meter, the 
energy storage system can charge with excess offshore wind and discharge during times of high 
demand. Connected to the grid in front of the meter, the energy storage system could operate similarly 
but also provide other services to the system when not being utilized by the offshore wind. This would 
maximize the benefits of the energy storage without increasing cost.  
7. While the expiration of the federal Investment Tax Credit (ITC) at the end of 2019 is expected 
to have a short-term impact on the cost of offshore wind, the cost of offshore wind 
development is currently expected to decline over time with improvements to technologies 
and supply chain.  
The cost of offshore wind has declined significantly in the last several years largely due to the increase 
size of the turbines which yield greater energy production while minimizing infrastructure costs.  In the 
United Kingdom, this has led to a price decline of over 50 percent between its auctions held in 2015 
(£120/MWh) versus 2017 (£57.50).  Along with technology improvements, growth of the U.S. domestic 
offshore wind supply chain is anticipated to reduce costs by lowering shipping costs and minimizing risk 
of disruption to construction schedules.  Current projections anticipate that the levelized cost of energy 
will decline by approximately 3 percent per year between 2020-2030.8  While the expiration of the 
federal ITC may have a short-term effect on the price of offshore wind, the long-term trend of declining 
costs is anticipated to continue due to these additional factors. 
8. At this time, procurements that provide long-term contracts are necessary for offshore wind 
projects to be financed and constructed. 
Currently the Independent Service Operator New England’s (ISO-NE) wholesale market is unable to 
provide enough revenue and certainty to secure financing to construct offshore wind projects.  ISO-NE’s 
Forward Capacity Market (FCM) provides a fixed revenue stream that is estimated to cover roughly just 
ten to fifteen percent of the fixed costs to build and operate an offshore wind project.9  In contrast, ISO-
NE’s FCM provides a fixed revenue stream that is estimated to cover roughly two-thirds of the capital 
cost of a new gas-fired plant for its first seven years of operation.10  Other revenue sources from energy 
and REC markets are volatile making it challenging to finance offshore wind.  Given the inability for 
offshore wind developers to receive sufficient revenue certainty from the wholesale market, offshore 
wind projects will not be able to be financed and constructed solely from the wholesale market at this 
time. 
                                                          
8 Annual Technology Baseline Data, National Renewable Energy Laboratory, 2018 




9. However, there are risks with having a significant portion of electricity demand under long-
term contracts.  
The EDCs collectively have executed a total of 62 long-term contracts, ending at various times, for a total 
financial commitment of over $22 billion.  Annually, 1,600 MW of offshore wind represents 6,000,000 
MWh of energy or 15 percent of EDC demand. With an additional 1,600 MW of offshore wind, over half 
(approximately 60 percent) of the EDCs electricity load will be supplied through long-term contracts 
instead of the wholesale competitive markets. This high amount of energy tied up in long-term contracts 
may impact wholesale markets and may shift risk to ratepayers as energy markets change. Flexibility to 
capture declines in cost and other benefits from changes in technologies could be lost over time.  
Successful procurements “rely on the strong balance sheets and credit profiles” of the EDCs to 
secure the most competitive bids and lowest prices.11 The EDCs have stated that the “cumulative 
impact of these long-term obligations could ultimately negatively affect the financial profiles of the 
Distribution Companies.”12  The Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities’ (DPU) order for the 
Vineyard Wind contract acknowledged the size of the EDCs’ contracting obligation and the possibility of 
these contracts could “negatively impact the Companies’ credit ratings and result in increased costs that 
would ultimately be passed on to ratepayers”.13   
Also, as more clean energy enters the competitive wholesale market through fixed long- term contracts, 
some stakeholders stated that there is a risk that financial institutions will lose confidence in the market, 
leading to increase energy prices for ratepayer. These additional risks to ratepayers due to the size and 
number of these contracts cannot be quantified at this time and may change as market rules and 
regulations shift over time.  
Findings – Solicitation Process 
1. Predictable, staggered offshore wind procurements targeting 800 MW has the potential to 
capture additional economic benefits of a growing offshore wind industry in the Northeast. 
Northeast states including New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut are pursuing aggressive offshore 
wind targets, showing a large opportunity for the growth of a northeast offshore wind industry. A 
staggered predictable procurement schedule would provide increased market visibility which would lead 
to greater predictability in the market for supply chain providers, lowering risk of investment in 
Massachusetts. Staggering solicitations enables multiple points for developers to enter the market while 
protecting ratepayers and the Commonwealth from being over reliant on one project.   
As a region, an organized pipeline of offshore wind solicitations in the U.S. may increase investments in 
domestic supply chain services.  This contributes to lower offshore wind costs by minimizing shipping 
costs and disruption in construction schedules.  Staggering solicitations is important as it enables 
                                                          
11Section 83 Distribution Companies Joint Testimony, DPU 18-76 through 18-78, page 41. 
12 Id. at 42. 
13 DPU Order, DPU 18-76 through 18-78, page 69. 
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multiple points for developers to enter the market while protecting ratepayers and the Commonwealth 
from being over reliant on one project.  A procurement schedule would clearly indicate to neighboring 
states when Massachusetts would be undertaking solicitations, fostering an opportunity for improved 
coordination of procurements. 
Additionally, efforts are underway to consider the extension of the federal ITC for offshore wind 
projects.  The federal ITC has an impact on project financing and could impact the procurement 
schedule. 
2. Ideally, solicitations should be at least 24-30 months apart to adequately capture lessons 
learned from prior solicitations, provide sufficient time for stakeholder feedback, create robust 
competition and to better align with the growth in the RPS and CES markets.  
Utilizing a staggered procurement schedule with 800 MW solicitations will allow for projects to be 
evaluated as energy and RPS markets change, while capturing economies of scale and anticipated 
declines in cost. Effective and successful solicitations required significant time from an experienced and 
diverse team. Contracts entered into by the EDCs are multi-billion-dollar contracts that have long-term 
cost implications on ratepayers and require adequate time to develop a fair process to fully evaluate the 
proposals. Additionally, stakeholder feedback has assisted the RFP process and adequate engagement 
requires time to complete to incorporate lessons learned.  Figure 6 summarizes the necessary steps and 
milestones required to undertake a solicitation in Massachusetts.  The process takes approximately 24-
30 months to complete process.  Therefore, solicitations should occur no sooner than 24 months 
following the issuance of the RFP.   
 
Figure 6: Procurement Process Timeline 
Allowing for time between solicitations also provides benefits in the RPS and CES markets which 
increase annually. Too much procured clean energy in a short period of time will saturate the REC 
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market with an oversupply of certificates, greatly reducing their value and therefore the overall benefit 
and cost-effectiveness of the project.  
3. In order to evaluate benefits of independent transmission and maximize transmission 
competition, potential transmission solutions would need to be identified and evaluated prior 
to the solicitations for 1,600 MW of additional offshore wind. 
With the passage of the Clean Energy Act of 2018, DOER is now able to require distribution companies 
to jointly and competitively solicit and procure proposals for offshore wind energy transmission.  
Independent transmission has the potential benefit of minimizing impact on fisheries, optimizing the 
transmission grid, and reducing costs.  These potential benefits must be weighed against potential cost 
to construct the network and potential risks of stranded costs if the system is not operational when 
required by generation assets.   
In order for a transmission solution to be open to wider competition and for the benefits to be 
evaluated effectively, a transmission only solicitation would need to be separate from the energy 
generation and would need to be completed before the offshore wind generation is solicited. 
For example, following a one-time transmission only solicitation, a preferred option for independent 
transmission could be contingently selected.  In the subsequent solicitations for offshore wind 
generation, bidders would be required to pair their generation with both a generator lead line 
construction and the preferred independent transmission solution from the previous one-time 
solicitation for independent transmission. This would allow evaluation of two options for each offshore 
wind generation bid: one with a generator-lead line and one with the independent transmission option.  
Then the most beneficial option to ratepayers could be selected. 
4. The offshore wind industry is rapidly evolving, and other states are undertaking efforts outside 
of the procurements to secure economic development. 
The landscape on offshore wind sector has changed dramatically since 2016.  Offshore wind developers 
are not as reliant on Massachusetts procurements in order to build projects because multiple other 
states are issuing solicitations for offshore wind energy.  The solicitation processes in other states are 
also evaluating economic development as a component of their procurement, creating increased 
competition for Massachusetts to secure the economic development opportunities. Outside of 
procurements, other states are creating offshore wind tax credit programs and making investments in 
port infrastructure to increase economic development within their state.  Notably, New Jersey with its 
$100 million offshore wind tax credit program, New York with its $200 million support for port 
infrastructure, and Connecticut with its $35.5 million investment its port facility in New London, are 
taking additional steps outside of energy procurements to position themselves for greater economic 
activity.  The assumption that economic development will be secured solely through procurements no 
longer holds true.  The Commonwealth should also recognize that economic development funded 
through procurements is ultimately reflected in the price for offshore wind, which increases costs for 
electric ratepayers.  In order for Massachusetts to maintain its leading position, the state should 
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continue to create economic development programs outside of the procurements in addition to 
continuing to evaluate it as a criterion within the procurements processes. 
5. As part of the solicitation process, the EDCs make up the Selection Team. Although some 
stakeholders have raised concerns about the Selection Team because of EDC-affiliated 
companies, the Independent Evaluator participates in and monitors the solicitation to ensure a 
fair and objective process, especially regarding any affiliate relationships.  
The EDCs are the contracting parties who have undertaken the procurements in Massachusetts.  The 
EDCs have affiliate companies that are unregulated owners of generation and transmission assets, and 
in some cases have been a part of a developer’s team who has submitted proposals to the 
procurements being undertaken by the EDCs.  Due to the potential for a conflict of interest, a stringent 
code of standards has been put in place and statute requires an independent evaluator has been hired 
to “ensure an open, fair and transparent solicitation and bid process that is not unduly influenced by an 
affiliate company”.14  In each procurement, the independent evaluator has concluded that the process 
was properly and fairly conducted and the bid selection decision was objective and in accordance with 
RFP criteria.    
Under the established process, the selection team is comprised of the EDCs and if the EDCs cannot 
unanimously agree on the same bid, the final binding decision would be made by DOER, after consulting 
with the independent evaluator.  In the recent 83C and 83D solicitations, the EDCs could not reach 
unanimous agreement and the selection was made by DOER.  Other states that are undertaking similar 
procurements have different procedures as established through their own laws and regulations.  For 
example, in Connecticut, the EDCs are a part of the evaluation team, but the selection of the projects is 
made by the Commissioner of the Department of Energy and Environmental Protection, in consultation 
with others.   
Recommendations 
1. The EDCs should proceed with additional offshore wind solicitations for up to 1,600 MW of 
offshore wind and only enter into contracts if found to be cost-effective. 
Based on the information that DOER has before it at this time, an analysis on costs and benefits of an 
additional procurement justify moving forward with up to 1,600 MW of additional offshore wind 
solicitations.  Given uncertainty around regional REC market projections, the cost effectiveness of all 
proposals should continue to be evaluated at the time of the solicitation.  To protect ratepayers, any 
future solicitations should maintain a price cap similar to the price of the first 83C contract.  
Under current market conditions, in order to capture the greatest impact to the Massachusetts 
Greenhouse Gas Inventory for GWSA compliance while reducing ratepayer costs, incremental offshore 
wind RECs should first be used to offset existing regulatory compliance costs associated with the RPS 
                                                          
14 Section 83C(f) 
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and CES. Once so met, if there are additional offshore wind RECs that exceed the Massachusetts RPS and 
CES obligations, these certificates should be retained in Massachusetts for GWSA compliance instead of 
being sold.15 This ensures Massachusetts ratepayers receive an additional benefit of the greenhouse gas 
emissions reduction from the offshore wind projects. 
2. Using the solicitation process framework for offshore wind generation provided in Section 83C, 
the additional procurements should be conducted for up to 800 MW in 2022, 2024 and, if 
necessary, to meet the procurement target, 2026. DOER should conduct a technical conference 
to assess whether and/or how a solicitation for independent transmission should occur and if 
necessary, issue a separate contingent solicitation for independent transmission in 2020 prior 
to additional solicitations for offshore wind.  
The proposed schedule strikes a balance between capturing cost effectiveness offered by later 
procurements with a steady pipeline of solicitations to spur and maintain economic development 
opportunities. A defined schedule provides market visibility for supply chain development, increasing 
opportunities for economic development and benefits for the Commonwealth. Visibility on the schedule 
will also increase opportunity to coordinate with other states and other solicitations. 
Beginning the additional offshore wind solicitations will increase the likelihood of cost-effective 
proposals and successful solicitations. This timing aligns future development with the growing demand 
for clean energy in RPS and CES markets. Additionally, this schedule will leverage the anticipated cost 
declines of the technology. However, if changes are made to federal ITC, the schedule should be 
adjusted as appropriate.   
                                                          
15 Under Acts of 2018, Chapter 227, DOER may notify the EDCs to retain any renewable energy certificates to 





Figure 7: Procurement Schedule 
The only feasible way to evaluate the benefits and cost effectiveness of independent transmission is to 
undertake a separate one-time transmission only process prior to undertaking a solicitation for 
generation.  DOER should hold a technical conference with stakeholders to evaluate whether a 
solicitation for independent transmission should occur and how the solicitation should be undertaken.  
The transmission solicitation could occur in 2020, prior to the solicitation for the additional offshore 
wind generation, which would follow the solicitation process and framework provided in Section 83C. If 
the solicitation results in the identification of a preferred transmission solution, the additional offshore 
wind solicitation may include a requirement for generation developers to propose projects that utilize 
the identified transmission.  
3. DOER should consider the benefits of an energy storage solicitation along with continuing to 
allow paired storage in the additional offshore wind solicitation. 
Analysis showed that there are benefits to energy storage, especially with grid-connected systems, by 
providing grid flexibility as intermittent renewable generation increases. Securing energy storage paired 
with offshore wind generation as currently allowed through the offshore wind solicitations may be 
challenging because the price cap was set in the first 83C solicitation by a project without paired energy 
storage. Although the addition of energy storage may increase the overall benefits of the project, it 
would likely also increase the cost to the contract. Completing an energy storage solicitation separately 
and in addition to the offshore wind solicitation may identify cost-effective creative energy storage 
solutions that maximize energy storage benefits. A separate energy storage solicitation may also help 
meet any obligations created by the Clean Peak Standard more cost-effectively. 
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4. The Commonwealth should continue to evaluate ways to cost-effectively finance clean energy, 
reduce risk to ratepayers and improve the procurement process. 
There are multiple areas that DOER should continue to study as the Commonwealth moves forward with 
additional offshore wind solicitations.  
• First, further assessment would be useful in determining the effect long-term contracts 
have on the EDCs balance sheets and wholesale markets. Since 2008, the Massachusetts 
EDCs have assembled a portfolio of cost-effective clean and renewable energy power 
purchase agreements (PPAs) under the Green Communities Act and subsequent 
amendments with over half (approximately 60 percent) of the EDCs’ electricity load 
anticipated to be supplied through long-term contracts instead of the wholesale 
competitive markets. The need, costs, and risks to Massachusetts ratepayers for long-
term contracts should be continuously evaluated in the context of our changing energy 
landscape. 
• Second, while offshore wind provides unique energy and environmental attributes, the 
Commonwealth’s energy and environmental goals and the competitiveness of the wind 
industry would benefit from comparative evaluation of all renewable and clean energy 
resources through the competitive solicitation process.  Offshore wind has intrinsic 
resource attributes that make it particularly compelling, including coincident production 
with expensive winter peak periods, relative close proximity to electric load, and onshore 
economic development opportunities.  However, there continues to be rapid innovation 
in all renewable and clean energy resources and as evidenced by the sharp decline in 
pricing in offshore wind just two years from the enactment of the Energy Diversity Act of 
2016, expectations of future pricing of other resources may also change quickly.  As a 
result, DOER recommends that the statute be revised to authorize the Commissioner of 
DOER, after review, to expand eligible resources under competitive solicitations to include 
other RPS and CES resources.  This would allow the Commonwealth to compare all clean 
and renewable resources and advance the clean or renewable project that best meets the 
environmental, economic, and energy goals of the GWSA while eliminating the need for a 
statutory price cap for offshore wind projects.  This change would proactively address the 
chance of not identifying a cost-effective project through future solicitations if pricing 
were to fall for other renewable and clean resources while increasing for offshore wind.  
• Additionally, although the Independent Evaluator stated the first 83C solicitation was 
“properly and fairly conducted,”16 some stakeholders have suggested that DOER, after 
participating as a member of the Evaluation Team and in consultation with the 
Independent Evaluator, should select this winning proposal following written 
recommendation from each of the EDCs.  DOER recommends continuing to utilize the 
                                                          
16 Independent Evaluator Report, DPU D.P.U. 18-76/18-77/18-78 
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Independent Evaluator and assess the selection process and whether there are 
opportunities for improvement in order to minimize any identified risk from affiliated 
projects.  
5. While procurements should continue to encourage developers to maximize economic 
development opportunities, the Commonwealth should evaluate whether there is value in 
doing economic development for the offshore wind industry outside of the procurements. 
There is a limit to the amount of economic development that can be financed through the contracts if 
the pricing of any additional offshore wind procurements continues at or declines below current levels 
to help achieve cost-effectiveness. Also, as more economic development is included in procurements, 
there is a risk that it could increase the cost of electricity contracts, which could have detrimental impact 
on economic development for other energy-intensive industries.  Therefore, Massachusetts 
procurements should continue to encourage developers to maximize economic development 
opportunities and we should continue to include it as evaluation criterion.  However, consideration 
should be given to the balance of having economic development costs in the procurement contracts 
which impacts electricity rates versus other economic development mechanisms outside these 
contracts.  It is worthwhile to continue to look at economic development outside of the procurements 
to enable an “industry cluster” to develop in the Commonwealth.  
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Appendix A: State Offshore Wind Economic Development 
State Procurement Economic Investment 
Massachusetts 
• Authority to procure 1,600 MW of 
cost-effective offshore wind by 
2027 
• Authority for DOER to require an 
additional 1,600 MW to be 
solicited by 2035 
• +$100m state investment in port 
infrastructure in New Bedford 
• Secured $15m from developer for 
offshore wind accelerator fund. 
• Secured $15m in resiliency and 
affordability funds 
• Secured $16m in host community 
agreement 
Connecticut 
• Authority to procure 3% of load 
from offshore wind 
• Authority to procure zero carbon 
resources which include offshore 
wind 
• Pending legislation proposes to 
establish 2,000 MW offshore wind 
goal” 
• $35.5m state investment its port 
facility in New London 
• Secured $35m from developers for 
port improvements and other in-
state construction commitments 
• $22.5m in previously committed 
from developer for State Pier 
infrastructure improvements 
New Jersey 
• Authority for 3,500 MW of 
offshore wind by 2030 
• $100m Offshore Wind Tax Credit 
Program 
New York 
• Authority for 2,400 MW of 
offshore wind by 2030 
• State goal for 9,000 MW of 
offshore wind by 2035 
• $200m state investment in port 
infrastructure 
Rhode Island 
• No set target for offshore wind 
• Procuring offshore wind under two 
statutes for renewable energy 
• Secured $40m from developers for 
port improvements 
Maryland 
• 2.5% carve-out for offshore wind in 
the RPS 
• Legislation passed to double the 
RPS, requiring 1,200 MW of 
additional offshore wind to meet 
2.5% carve-out 
• Secured $39.6m for port 
improvements and $76m in steel 
fabrication plant from developers 
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Appendix B: Stakeholder Engagement List 
DOER would like to thank the many stakeholders that provided feedback in the offshore wind study 
process either through coordinated meetings with DOER staff and consultants or through written 
comments. The feedback received was instrumental in the identification of areas for investigation and 
guidance on recommendations. DOER will continue to work with stakeholders on offshore wind matter 
as local development continues.  
For written stakeholder comments, please refer to https://www.mass.gov/service-details/offshore-
wind-study 
Stakeholder Engagement List 
Acadia Center New Bedford Port Authority 
Anbaric New Bedford Seafood Consulting 
Associated Industries of Massachusetts New England Power Generation Association 
Atlantic Wind Connection Northeastern University 
Bristol Community College Old Bedford Village Community Development 
Calpine Orsted 
CLF POWER-US 
Commercial Fisherman (various) Renew Northeast 
Environment Massachusetts Research and Policy 
Center 
Responsible Offshore Development Alliance 
Environmental League of Massachusetts Richard Kerver 
Environmental Organization Consortium Seakeeper 
Equinor Self-Reliance Corporation 
Eversource Siemens Gamesa 
Fisheries Survival Fund Sierra Club 
HQ US Southeastern Massachusetts Consortium 
ISO-NE The Energy Consortium 
K2 Management Tufts University 
Martha's Vineyard Fishermen's Preservation Trust University of Massachusetts- Amherst 
Mass Audubon University of Massachusetts - Dartmouth 
Massachusetts Lobstermen’s Association University of Massachusetts - Lowell 
Mayflower Wind Union of Concerned Scientists 
National Grid Unitil 
National Wildlife Federation Vineyard Wind 
Nature Conservancy Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution 
New Bedford Economic Development Council  
 
